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1. Introduction 
Revenue mobilization in developing countries ranks usually on top of the agenda of 
international summits on development. In particular, in Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA), 
tax-revenue ratios remain chronically low, while these countries have a considerable need of 
domestic resources to finance poverty reduction and develop their infrastructures. The most 
recent empirical contributions trying to unearth the determinants of this incapacity to increase 
tax-revenue ratios point towards structural as well as institutional factors.1 In this context it is 
noteworthy to highlight Keen and Lockwood’s (2010) findings of a significant positive 
relationship between VAT adoption and government revenue, except for SSA countries. More 
generally, a positive impact of institutional quality, in interaction with other structural factors 
such as natural resources, has been documented for SSA countries (e.g. Botlhole et al., 2012). 
Our paper contributes to this empirical literature by (i) using a new indicator of a business law 
reform, and testing its impact on tax revenue and total revenue, for a large panel of SSA 
countries; and (ii) we account for potential endogeneity issues by relying on instrumental 
variables techniques using internal instruments (Lewbel, 2012). 
 
2. Data and institutional background 
Our analysis covers a large panel of 41 SSA countries over the period 1990 to 2013, making it 
one of the largest coverage so far for this type of studies.2 We use alternatively as dependent 
variables tax revenue and total government revenue, both excluding grants, and expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. The difference between these two indicators essentially comes from 
income from property which is crucial for countries with oil or mining rents. 
Our variable of business law reform is constructed so as to reflect fundamental institutional 
changes and avoid the usual distinction between Common law vs Civil (Napoleonic) law 
countries. Indeed, during the 1990s and 2000s decades, a lot of African countries which had 
inherited legal systems through colonialism undertook modernization of their business law. 
The OHADA3 process is the most prominent. It associates 17 French-speaking countries in 
establishing harmonized acts applicable in every jurisdiction directly, mainly since 1997. But 
other countries (for example Kenya, Rwanda, South-Africa…) also recently updated their 
corporate law and instituted new rules to secure and modernize the legal environment for 
business (Astier, 2012).  
Our indicator variable captures the year of a fundamental change in the national business law, 
and is set equal to 1 the year of the implementation of the change, as well as all subsequent 
periods, allowing intercept and slope shifts (when using interactions terms). Identification of 
such a change is based on two sources: (i) the “Doing Business Law Library”4 supplemented 
by (ii) Country Reports of KPMG Africa. While one shortcoming of our indicator is its binary 
nature, we thereby circumvent the criticism of the “law and development” literature, which 
argues that a bias may result from the use of perception indicators such as the “rule of laws 
index” (Arndt and Omar, 2006; Siems, 2011; Voigt, 2012). Furthermore, our indicator being 
based on changes in the business law, it is well-admitted that such changes are usually 
substantial, and therefore leave little latitude for interpretation.  
                                                          
1
 See for instance, Gupta 2007; Keen and Mansour, 2010; Botlhole et al. 2012; Keen and Lockwood, 2010; 
Thomas and Treviño 2013. 
2
 In a similar study, Gupta et al. (2007) use a panel of 44 countries for the group of all low income countries. 
3
 French acronym for ”Organisation Pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires”. 
4
 URL: www.doingbusiness.org/law-library : exhaustive collection of business laws and regulations 
(commercial and companies’ laws, civil codes, bankruptcy and collateral laws, securities laws, and related 
items). 
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Table I displays the list of countries that have changed their business law. At the beginning of 
our period under scrutiny, out of 42 countries, only four countries had reformed their business 
law. During the period 1997 to 2002, this number substantially increased, following the 
implementation of the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) by seventeen West 
and Central African nations.  
 
Table I: Countries having undergone a business law reform 
Period Countries 
before 1997 Mauritius, Botswana, Zambia, Burundi 
1997-2002 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Congo, Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Ghana, 
Madagascar, Mauritania, Gambia 
2003-2008 Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa 
after 2008 Rwanda, Swaziland, Kenya, Lesotho, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Uganda 
N.B. no substantial reforms identified for the following countries: Angola, Cabo Verde, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, 
Sudan, Zimbabwe (a detailed table is available from the authors upon request). It is worth noting that amongst the 
countries identified as having undergone no substantial reforms, the Seychelles stands out by the fact that their 
law has been business friendly even before the period under scrutiny. 
 
Business law reforms have an impact on tax mobilization through several channels. Firstly, 
reforms may have the ambition to increase the size of the formal sector to the detriment of the 
informal, and hard to tax, sector. In this direct channel, often considered naïve, the informal 
sector is considered as a disease that should be reduced as much as possible. Secondly, and 
more importantly, business law reforms may permeate the informal sector by useful legal 
vehicles, such as arbitration or economic interest group, in order to increase the predictability 
of transactions while limiting government abuse (Moore-Dickerson, 2011). Finally, the 
essential goal of business reforms is to attract and secure (possibly foreign) investments, and 
hence indirectly increasing revenue mobilization. 
Tax reforms are the natural way to mobilize tax revenues. In our empirical framework, we also 
take account of VAT adoption, which has been the main tax reform in SSA during the last 
decades (Fossat and Bua, 2013; Kloeden, 2011).  
Finally, we control for a number of other structural variables, considered as standard 
determinants of tax revenue mobilization: income per capita; the share of agriculture in GDP, 
as a proxy of the informal sector size; trade openness; conflict; official development aid; and 
an indicator of natural resource rents. All definitions and sources of data are detailed in the 
Appendix (Table A.I). 
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
We rely on the following specification, in order to measure the impact of business law reforms 
on tax mobilization: ��� = ߙ + ߚଵܤ��ܧܨ�� + ߚଶ�ܣ��� + ���ߚ′ + �� + ߛ� + ��� , (1) 
where ���ሺ= ��ܩܦ� �� �ܧ�ܩܦ�ሻ is the ratio of tax revenue (or total revenue excluding 
grants) to GDP, in country i during the period t. ܤ��ܧܨ�� is our indicator variable of business 
law reforms, and �ܣ��� accounts for tax reforms. ��� is a set of structural variables, listed in 
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the previous section. Finally, �� denotes country specific, time invariant unobservables, ߛ� is a 
time-effect and ��� is the disturbance term. 
A major issue we are facing comes from the endogenous nature of our two variables of interest 
BLREFit and VATit. To address this problem, in the absence of a valid external instrument 
satisfying the exclusion restriction, we rely on Lewbel’s (2012) internal instrumental approach, 
using higher order moment restrictions to tackle endogeneity. Identification is achieved 
through a two-stage procedure. In the first stage we regress, as well as interaction terms where 
BLREFit (VATit) appear against Xit. We then use the mean-centered deviation of the vector of 
independent variables, Xit interacted with the residual from the first-stage regression, as the 
identifying instruments.5 Critical to the identification process is that errors obtained in the first 
stage are heteroscedastic. We rely on a Breusch-Pagan procedure to test this. 
 
4. Results 
In Tables II and A.II, estimation results of specification (1) are presented, using panel data 
fixed effects techniques in the former table and adding instrumental variables in the latter. Each 
table is divided in two panels: a left panel relying on tax revenue as a percentage of GDP 
(TRGDP) as the dependent variable, and a right panel using total government revenue as a 
percentage of GDP (REVGDP).  
All control variables display expected signs. GDP per capita (LNGDPCAP) is positive and 
significant, as the capacity to mobilize taxes goes hand in hand with economic development. 
Similarly, the coefficient of the share of agricultural value added in GDP (AGRICVA) has a 
negative and significant sign in all regressions, highlighting the difficulty in collecting taxes in 
sectors more prone to be informal. Development aid (ODA) does not contribute to any of our 
dependent variables, neither positively nor negatively, as debated in the literature (Gupta, 
2007). Trade openness (OPEN) and the conflict dummy (CONF) display changing significance 
according to the dependent variable. Property revenue, which is the main difference between 
the two dependent variables, is key here.  
The main variable of interest, BLREF positively affects tax and governmental revenues in most 
regressions. In column Ia (Ib), results suggest that countries having undergone a business law 
reform will increase their tax revenue share (total governmental revenue share) by 0.9 (1.4) 
percentage points (compared to a median value of 13 (17) per cent). In column IIa, the effect 
remains positive (and is even reinforced in column IIb) when taking account of a possible 
interaction with the presence of natural resources (NRR). When considering REVGDP, only 
the interaction is significant, whereas the level effect of BLREF becomes marginally 
insignificant. Finally, columns IIIa, IIIb, IVa, and IVb of both panels take account of the 
adoption/substantial reform of a VAT system, and its interaction with the BLREF. As for the 
openness variable (OPEN), the VAT variable seems only to impact TRGDP. REVGDP 
including property revenues are only influenced by VAT via the presence of NRR. When taking 
jointly care of BLREF and VAT reform, these variables are mutually reinforcing, both for 
TRGDP and REVGDP. This result validates the intuition of complementary between tax and 
business law reforms (Dourado, 2013). 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 This approach has been adopted previously to analyse the effects of access to domestic and international 
markets on poverty in China (Emran and Hou, 2013), to estimate occupational choice on health behaviour 
(Kelly et al., 2014). A special case of this method has been used by Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) to specifically 
instrument institutions. 
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Table II: Fixed effects estimations 
 
 
Table A.II presents results relying on Lewbel’s (2012) instrumental approach. Qualitatively, 
they are quite close to estimation results in Table I. The coefficient on our variables of interest 
BLREF and VAT are slightly lower when using our instrumental variable approach, pointing 
towards an upward bias in Table II results (due to a positive correlation between BLREF and 
the dependent variables). Also the OPEN and the CONF variables have consistent signs across 
specifications, and in particular for both dependent variables, in line with results in most of the 
literature in the area. Interaction terms with our variables of interest are consistent and even 
sometimes reinforced compared to FE results. In particular, the interaction between VAT and 
NRR is now positive and significant, in column IVb of the second panel, in line with column 
IIIb results. 
Further results are very similar in both tables, and therefore do not warrant further comments. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we use a new indicator of a significant modernization of corporate law, meant at 
improving the legal environment for business. This complements the standard institutional 
indicators, based on perception. Furthermore, in order to overcome the potential endogeneity 
issue, we rely on an internal instrumental variable approach.  
Our empirical results validate the influence of business (and tax law) reforms on countries’ tax 
mobilization ability. Furthermore, the complementarity between business and tax law reform, 
amply discussed in the law and economics literature, is supported by our econometric results. 
 
(Ia) (IIa) (IIIa) (IVa) (Ib) (IIb) (IIIb) (IVb)
VARIABLES
BLREF 0.873** 2.024*** 0.311 1.392** 0.655 -0.340
[0.403] [0.446] [0.699] [0.542] [0.614] [1.001]
VAT 1.264*** 0.862 -0.812 -1.249*
[0.454] [0.539] [0.623] [0.739]
LNGDPCAP 3.375*** 3.308*** 3.405*** 3.191*** 3.312*** 3.373*** 3.456*** 3.159***
[0.694] [0.680] [0.684] [0.686] [0.933] [0.930] [0.941] [0.945]
OPEN 2.631*** 2.383*** 2.726*** 2.666*** 1.162 1.289 1.093 1.054
[0.826] [0.811] [0.807] [0.808] [1.133] [1.129] [1.132] [1.135]
AGRICVA -0.062*** -0.065*** -0.053*** -0.063*** -0.087*** -0.086*** -0.079*** -0.091***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
NRR -0.053** 0.037 0.055** 0.054* 0.173*** 0.118*** 0.112*** 0.110***
[0.022] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.030] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037]
CONF -0.303 -0.566 -0.482 -0.674 -1.806*** -1.637*** -1.464** -1.705***
[0.438] [0.431] [0.428] [0.429] [0.587] [0.589] [0.587] [0.590]
ODA -0.204 -0.147 -0.022 -0.054 -0.089 -0.118 -0.141 -0.159
[0.197] [0.194] [0.194] [0.193] [0.266] [0.265] [0.267] [0.267]
BLREF*NRR -0.105*** -0.004 0.066** 0.011
[0.019] [0.033] [0.026] [0.045]
VAT*NRR -0.123*** -0.126*** 0.084*** 0.067
[0.019] [0.033] [0.026] [0.046]
BLREF*VAT 1.167* 1.915**
[0.660] [0.935]
Constant 10.160*** 9.359*** 10.328*** 11.010*** 13.236*** 13.734*** 17.183*** 18.067***
[1.380] [1.360] [1.287] [1.296] [1.874] [1.878] [1.794] [1.810]
Observations 772 772 772 772 770 770 770 770
Number of countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
Country fixed country and time dummies
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TRGDP REVGDP
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6. Appendix 
 
Table A.I: Definition of variables and data sources 
Variable Definition Source 
TRGDP Tax revenue/GDP, % of GDP.  GFS (IMF), complemented  
by Art. 4 reports from IMF 
REVGDP Total government revenue/GDP, % of GDP, excluding 
grants  
GFS (IMF), complemented  
by Art. 4 reports from IMF 
BLREF Business law reform, (dummy variable 0/1) Author’s definition 
VAT Adoption of a VAT system, or fundamental reform of the 
VAT system, (dummy variable, 0/1) 
IMF, Fossat P., Bua M., 2013; Kloeden D.,
2011. 
LNGDPCAP GDP per capita (in Log form) WB (WDI) 
OPEN Trade openness (Exports+Imports/GDP) WB (WDI), Author’s calculation 
AGRICVA Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) WB (WDI) 
NRR Natural resource rents (% of GDP) WB (WDI) 
CONF External and internal conflicts Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
ODA Net Official Development Aid, billion US$ OECD 
 
 
Table A.II: Lewbel method 
 
 
(Ia) (IIa) (IIIa) (IVa) (Ib) (IIb) (IIIb) (IVb)
VARIABLES
BLREF 0.446* 1.643*** 0.257 0.829*** 0.058 -0.402
[0.247] [0.200] [0.163] [0.309] [0.281] [0.307]
VAT 1.486*** 0.861*** -0.735** -1.257***
[0.250] [0.140] [0.329] [0.252]
LNGDPCAP 2.916*** 2.943*** 2.954*** 3.128*** 2.471** 3.212*** 3.622*** 3.191***
[0.683] [0.496] [0.481] [0.256] [0.962] [0.683] [0.660] [0.409]
OPEN 4.267*** 2.873*** 3.157*** 2.856*** 2.769** 2.373*** 2.616*** 1.692***
[0.878] [0.541] [0.534] [0.255] [1.138] [0.819] [0.768] [0.498]
AGRICVA -0.037** -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.062*** -0.076*** -0.057*** -0.053** -0.075***
[0.016] [0.011] [0.012] [0.006] [0.027] [0.020] [0.021] [0.013]
NRR -0.074*** 0.021 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.169*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.110***
[0.023] [0.017] [0.017] [0.008] [0.038] [0.031] [0.032] [0.021]
CONF -0.087 -0.480** -0.379* -0.671*** -1.213** -1.136*** -1.108*** -1.480***
[0.306] [0.213] [0.212] [0.099] [0.490] [0.342] [0.352] [0.219]
ODA -0.090 -0.144* -0.009 -0.063* -0.012 -0.028 -0.070 -0.105
[0.137] [0.076] [0.071] [0.032] [0.193] [0.149] [0.141] [0.088]
BLREF*NRR -0.096*** -0.007 0.081*** 0.008
[0.009] [0.005] [0.017] [0.015]
VAT*NRR -0.130*** -0.129*** 0.086*** 0.072***
[0.012] [0.008] [0.017] [0.015]
BLREF*VAT 1.210*** 1.769***
[0.147] [0.279]
Constant 13.601*** 13.382*** 12.987*** 13.342*** 15.381*** 15.508*** 15.905*** 16.438***
[3.857] [3.950] [3.858] [3.812] [4.875] [4.775] [4.906] [4.839]
Hansen J statistic 111.914 72.693 115.389 165.208 79.5 108.75 111.311 229.836
(p-value) 0.9177 0.2961 0.8755 1 0.141 0.9463 0.9239 1
Observations 772 772 772 772 770 770 770 770
Number of countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
Country fixed country and time dummies
Breusch Pagan test reject null of no heteroskedasticity
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TRGDP REVGDP
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